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SOLVING CRIMES WITH 23ANDME: DNA
DATABASES AND THE FUTURE OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT
MEGHAN MCLOUGHLIN
INTRODUCTION
“It could never happen to me though, right?”
Sitting on our comfortable couches in our secure homes and
watching news stories about people who have lost loved ones to the
most terrible, violent crimes, we think to ourselves: “That’s awful
for them, but it won’t happen to me.” But what if it did?
Becoming a victim of a violent crime or loving someone who becomes a victim of a crime in the United States is not uncommon.
In 2016, 2.9 million people in the United States were victims of at
least one “violent crime”—crimes defined by their inherent violence, which include offenses like rape, murder, and sexual assault.1 In the same year, 28.4% of people between the ages of
twenty-five and thirty-four were victims of violent crimes—for females, that percentage grew to 33.4%.2 In fact, the United States
has been reported to be one of the most dangerous countries in the
world.3
1 See Rachel E. Morgan & Grace Kena, Criminal Victimization 2016: Revised, BUREAU

JUST. STAT. (Oct. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv16re.pdf (clarifying that
“[v]iolent crime includes murder, rape and sexual assault, robbery, and assault.”). In most
states, rape differs from sexual assault because it requires penetration; sexual assault can
consist of any sort of unwanted sexual touching. See An Updated Definition of Rape, U.S
DEPT. OF JUST. ARCHIVES (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/updateddefinition-rap; see also Sexual Assault, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/articles/sexual-assault (last visited Feb. 10, 2021).
2 See Morgan & Kena, supra note 1. And those numbers are not changing any time
soon—the United States Department of Justice reported that there was no statistically significant change in those numbers from the data collected in 2015. See id.
3 See Laura Begley Bloom, Revealed: The 15 Most Dangerous Places to Live, FORBES
(Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurabegleybloom/2018/09/27/revealed-the15-most-dangerous-places-to-live/#729eb19f4706. In this survey, 18,135 ex-pats living in
187 territories outside the US ranked the territories based on peacefulness, personal safety,
OF
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Even worse, many of these crimes go unsolved. In the past decade, 54,868 homicides were committed in the United States.4 Out
of those, fifty percent never resulted in an arrest of any suspect.5
In 2017, only 34.5% of reported rapes resulted in the prosecution
or identification of any perpetrator.6 Violent crimes are uniquely
situated because perpetrators often leave behind DNA at the crime
scenes—but even if a full forensic DNA profile was able to be salvaged, too often the forensic sample does not match any profile in
the DNA databases of the criminal justice system.7 This situation
creates a dead-end for law enforcement: no arrest can be made
since a forensic profile with no match in the system is like finding
a fingerprint without a suspect’s name attached to it—it is just a
useless, anonymous profile.8
So, what if there was a way for law enforcement to increase its
ability to solve these violent crimes? What if law enforcement
could theoretically access millions9 of more DNA profiles to compare to their “John Doe” profiles,10 thereby solving violent crimes
that haven’t been solved in decades? What if solace could finally
be given to those victims and their families, and what if violent
criminals could be prevented from committing these vicious crimes
for years on end?
Law enforcement has indeed found a way. In 2018, for the first
time, police sought to broaden their number of DNA profile comparisons to more than just the profiles in the criminal justice system’s database.11 They did so for one particular suspect, dubbed
and political stability—the United States was ranked at just 67% positive in personal
safety, which is 15% lower than the global average. See id.
4 See Steven Rich et al., Murder with Impunity, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/investigations/unsolved-homicide-database/?utm_term=.c939ebf721ca (last updated July 6, 2018).
5 See id.
6 See Clearances, FBI: UCR (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-inthe-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/clearances.
7 See Using DNA to Solve Crimes, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes.
8 See Eric Levenson, It Started as a Hobby. Now They’re Using DNA to Help Cops Crack
Cold Cases, CNN (March 27, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/03/health/dna-genealogycold-cases-trnd/index.html.
9 Ancestry Surpasses 5 Million People in DNA Database, Giving Customers Even More
Opportunities to Discover Who They Are and How They Connect to One Another,
ANCESTRYDNA (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.ancestry.com/corporate/newsroom/press-releases/ancestry-surpasses-5-million-people-dna-database-giving-customers-even-more.
10 “John Doe” profiles are what law enforcement call forensic profiles for which there is
no identifying match in their system.
11 See Sam Stanton & Darrell Smith, How Detectives Collected DNA Samples From the
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“The Golden State Killer,” who had committed at least sixty murders and rapes that had gone unsolved in California for over forty
years.12 Instead of only submitting the forensic profile found at the
scene to the national law enforcement database, as they had done
many times to no avail, law enforcement thought of a new way to
find a match. This time, detectives submitted the forensic profile
to GEDMatch.13
GEDMatch is a genealogy service that allows a customer to submit his genetic information that has already been analyzed by a
laboratory in order to compare that genetic information against
the GEDMatch database and potentially find unknown relatives
and other genealogy facts.14 Using this website, law enforcement
did get a hit—not on the suspect, but on one of his relatives.15 According to GEDMatch, someone genetically related to the suspect
had previously submitted his DNA information to the website for
comparison purposes; the relative’s DNA sample remained in the
database and was thus genetically linked to the profile submitted
by the law enforcement officers.16 Now possessing the name of this
relative, police were able to narrow down their large suspect pool
to only those people who were in the area at the time of the crimes
and were also related to this relative found on GEDMatch.17 After
a lengthy investigation into the branches of this relative’s family
tree, the only suspect that satisfied all of law enforcement’s criteria was a man named Joseph DeAngelo.18 Using this information,
the police were able to obtain a surreptitious19 sample of Joseph
DeAngelo’s DNA to compare to the samples found at the crime
East Area Rapist Suspect, SACRAMENTO BEE (June 1, 2018, 4:35 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article212334279.html.
12 See id.
13 See Avi Selk, The Ingenious and ‘Dystopian’ DNA Technique Police Used to Hunt the
‘Golden State Killer’ Suspect, WASH. POST (April 28, 2018, 1:50 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/2018/04/27/golden-state-killerdna-website-gedmatch-was-used-to-identify-joseph-deangelo-as-suspect-police-say/
14 See GEDmatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH,
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019) [hereinafter GEDmatch].
15 See Stanton & Smith, supra note 11.
16 See Selk, supra note 13.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See Paige St. John & Joseph Serna, Golden State Killer Suspect Must Provide New
DNA Samples and Fingerprints, Judge Rules, LA TIMES, (May 3, 2018, 9:20 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-golden-state-killer-evidence-20180503story.html. Law enforcement uses “surreptitious sample” to refer to those DNA samples
collected without the knowledge of the suspect. See id.
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scenes—which was a match—and finally arrested him for the
rapes and murders he allegedly committed over forty years ago.20
Commercial DNA databases from genealogy companies could
give law enforcement access to over fifteen-million more profiles to
compare against a suspect’s sample—that’s fifteen-million more
chances to catch the killer of a loved one and to prevent him from
hurting anyone again.21 A recent study shows that it would take
just two percent of the adult population’s DNA to be able to connect virtually anyone in the world to another—meaning that law
enforcement would be able to narrow down almost every suspect
pool once they gathered a DNA profile from a crime scene.22
Rockne Harmon, a former senior deputy district attorney in California, insists that if familial testing was more widely used, law
enforcement “would solve twice as many cases as [they] do now.”23
Moreover, granting law enforcement access to these databases
could even prevent crime by way of deterrence—lowering violent
criminals’ likelihood of reoffending by as much as seventeen percent.24 If this method had existed in the 1970s, it is likely that the
Golden State Killer would not have had the opportunity to commit
all the crimes he did.
However, immediately after this technological breakthrough,
questions arose as to whether the method could be considered a
constitutional search under the Fourth Amendment. While proponents of law enforcement welcomed the new technology, others admonished the method as a violation of commercial database customers’ privacy rights, fearing the implications of this massive tool
for law enforcement.25 Many news outlets and commentators have
20 See id.
21 See Lindsey Van Ness, DNA Databases Are Boon to Police But Menace to Privacy,

Critics Say, PEW (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/02/20/dna-databases-are-boon-to-police-but-menace-to-privacycritics-say.
22 See Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial Searches, 362 SCIENCE 690, 690–694 (2018), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/362/6415/690.
23 James Rainey, Familial DNA Puts Elusive Killers Behind Bars. But Only 12 States
Use It., NBC NEWS (April 28, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/familial-dna-puts-elusive-killers-behind-bars-only-12-states-n869711.
24 See Jennifer Doleac, Can DNA Databases Reduce Crime Rates?, FORBES (May 16,
2017, 3:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/05/16/can-dna-databases-reducecrime-rates/#391929805712.
25 See Matt Ford, How the Supreme Court Could Rewrite the Rules for DNA Searches,
NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/148170/supreme-court-rewrite-rules-dna-searches.

MCLOUGHLIN MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

DNA DATABASES AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

7/28/21 5:09 PM

321

even started warning people not to submit DNA to these companies.26
Since the Golden State Killer case, some large commercial DNA
databases have already started holding press conferences pledging
to never cooperate with law enforcement unless they are forced.27
Advocates have called for courts to declare the unconstitutionality
of these searches and to bar law enforcement’s use of these databases altogether.28 In fact, one state has even proposed a bill barring law enforcement from accessing these databases for crimesolving purposes altogether, claiming that the use by law enforcement violates the Fourth Amendment.29
This note rejects these objections and petitions for change as
wrongheaded. Law enforcement access to commercial DNA databases is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment because the
government’s interest in public safety outweighs the small expectation of privacy in samples of DNA voluntarily given to a third
party, particularly when used to prevent violent or sexual assault
crimes. Specifically, this access is constitutional under the thirdparty doctrine of the Fourth Amendment.
Part I of this note provides background through the discussion
of two topics: first, the history of DNA evidence in law enforcement
leading up to the use of commercial DNA databases; and second,
the concerns of privacy advocates that threaten the use of this
search method by law enforcement. Part II of this note explains
26 CTVNews.ca Staff, Privacy expert warns of risks of submitting DNA to genealogy websites, CTV NEWS (Apr. 25, 2018, 10:23 AM), https://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/privacy-expertwarns-of-risks-of-submitting-dna-to-genealogy-websites-1.3901264.
27 See generally Ancestry Guide for Law Enforcement, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/lawenforcement (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) [hereinafter Ancestry Law
Enforcement Guide]; see generally also 23andMe Guide for Law Enforcement,
23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/law-enforcement-guide (last visited Feb. 12, 2021)
[23andMe Law Enforcement Guide]. It is important to note that this note does not discuss
the analysis as to whether law enforcement can subpoena these companies into cooperating
with law enforcement in these matters. This note simply discusses whether or not it is constitutional for law enforcement to use their services. However, the fact that the companies
pledged to their customers not to cooperate is evidence of customer disapproval of law enforcement’s use, shedding light on the fact that this view could be translated into law at
some point.
28 Bloomberg, DNA Detectives are Searching for Killers in Your Family Tree, FORTUNE
(June 14, 2018, 10:02 AM), http://fortune.com/2018/06/14/dna-genealogy-websites-police.
29 See generally Public Safety – DNA Analysis – Search of Data Base, H.B. 30, Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2019); see also Natalie Jones, Maryland House bill seeks to prohibit using familial DNA databases to solve crime, BALTIMORE SUN (Feb. 20, 2019, 10:29 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-maryland-house-bill-dna-databases-0221story.html.
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the applicable law that will be used in the analysis: the third-party
doctrine of the Fourth Amendment. Part III will explain exactly
how this type of search is constitutional under the third-party doctrine of the Fourth Amendment by discussing the expectation of
privacy implicated in this search as well as the high need by law
enforcement to use this method of searching—which is a factor
weighed in the analysis of whether a search is “reasonable” under
the Fourth Amendment.30
I. BACKGROUND

A. DNA Usage
DNA evidence was first used by law enforcement in 1986 when
police asked a molecular biologist to analyze the DNA of a seventeen-year-old boy who had confessed to the rapes and murders of
two women in England.31 However, the first conviction using DNA
evidence was a rape case in California in 1987.32 In that case, the
DNA of the defendant, Tommy Lee Andrews, matched that of a
semen sample left at the crime scene.33 Since then, the use of DNA
evidence in investigations has become commonplace34 and even
expected part of proving the identity of the person who committed
a certain crime.35

30 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 5 (1976).
31 See Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for Crime Solving: A Judicial

and Legislative History, FORENSIC MAG (Jan. 6, 2005, 3:00 AM), https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2005/01/evolution-dna-evidence-crime-solving-judicial-and-legislativehistory. In this case, the DNA was actually exculpatory—it proved the defendant was not
the attacker. Eventually, that same DNA helped law enforcement find the true perpetrator.
Id.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/dna-evidence-its-genes-30060.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) “DNA testing is now common in criminal trials and in proving innocence after wrongful convictions.” Id.
35 See Matthew Shaer, The False Promise with DNA Testing, THE ATLANTIC, 8-9, 35
(June 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonabledoubt/480747 “Three-quarters of the jurors said they expected DNA evidence in rape cases,
and nearly half said they expected it in murder or attempted-murder cases; 22 percent said
they expected DNA evidence in every criminal case.” Id.
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After the usefulness of DNA information was established, databases of DNA started forming. For the purposes of this note, there
are two general types of DNA databases in existence today: governmental and commercial. The governmental DNA database is a
bank of DNA profiles that have been collected for a government
purpose.36 When someone is convicted of a crime, his or her DNA
is collected by the government.37 In 2013, the Supreme Court held
that it was constitutional to collect the DNA of people arrested for
serious offenses and not exclusively convicted offenders.38 Today,
DNA samples in the governmental bank include those of missing
persons, convicted offenders, arrestees, and unknown samples collected at the scene of a crime, known as forensic profiles.39
In the United States, the government’s DNA databank is called
the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).40 The database has
several levels and was established in 1994 by the FBI.41 The national level is referred to as the National DNA Index System
(NDIS). In 2018, this database contained over 13.5 million convicted offender profiles, over three-million arrestee profiles, and
almost one-million forensic profiles.42 The inherent composition of
this database is primarily made up of profiles of those individuals
who have come in contact with the criminal justice system—as a
victim or an offender—since the only profiles collected by the government are those that were involved in a crime in some form.43
Commercial DNA databases are comprised of an entirely different population. These databases, like AncestryDNA and
23andMe, are made up of DNA samples from people who affirmatively send in their DNA sample to the company for the purpose of
36 See Federal DNA Database, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometricanalysis/federal-dna-database#:~:text=The%20Federal%20DNA%20Database%20Unit,by%20law%20to%20do%20so (last visited Feb. 12,
2021).
37 See generally Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI,
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet
(last visited Feb. 12, 2021) [hereinafter NDIS Fact Sheet].
38 See generally Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465-6 (2013).
39 See generally CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Feb. 12, 2021) [hereinafter NDIS
Statistics].
40 See NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 37. The National DNA Index System or NDIS is
considered one part of CODIS, the national level, containing the DNA profiles “contributed
by federal, state, and local participating forensic laboratories.” Id.
41 See Ford, supra note 25.
42 See NDIS Statistics, supra note 39.
43 See Ford, supra note 25.
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obtaining a genealogical analysis of their DNA, irrespective of
whether or not they have committed a crime in the past.44 Most of
these companies, referred to as “direct-to-consumer” genealogy
service databases, send customers kits in which to deposit an actual DNA sample so that the company can analyze it in its own
laboratory.45 Created mostly after 2005,46 these companies then
analyze the sample, compare it against other samples in the databank, and send back results.47 These databases, unlike the governmental database, are comprised of DNA samples from people
who voluntarily submit their DNA to the company in order to receive a service.48
Still other commercial companies, like GEDMatch, simply compare a raw DNA profile submitted by a customer (that was already
analyzed by a laboratory) to other raw data in its system without
individually testing the sample in their own laboratories.49 These
companies do not ever possess any physical DNA samples. Instead, they receive the information a customer gives the company
about his or her DNA and compare it against profile information
that it has received from other customers.50 Practically, these companies usually market their services as providing a secondary database to which people can submit the results that they receive
from a commercial DNA database in order to compare their sample
to another pool of peoples’ information and obtain additional genealogical information.51 These companies drastically expand the
number of DNA profiles law enforcement can use for comparison
44 See AncestryDNA- Frequently Asked Questions, ANCESTRYDNA, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/en/legal/us/faq (last visited Jan. 30, 2021) [hereinafter AncestryDNA FAQ];
see also How it works, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/howitworks (last visited Jan. 30, 2021) [hereinafter 23ANDME].
45 See Ancestry Terms and Conditions, ANCESTRYDNA (Sept. 23, 2020),
https://www.ancestry.com/cs/legal/termsandconditions [hereinafter Ancestry DNA Terms];
see also 23ANDME, supra note 44.
46 See Ancestry.com Launches New AncestryDNA Service: The Next Generation of DNA
Science Poised to Enrich Family History Research, ANCESTRYDNA, http://www.ancestry.com/corporate/newsroom/press-releases/ancestry.com-dna-launches (last visited Jan.
30, 2021); see also About Us, 23ANDME, https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/aboutus/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
47 See AncestryDNA FAQ, supra note 44; see also How Can I See The Status Of My DNA
Sample?, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/202904780-HowCan-I-See-the-Status-of-My-DNA-Sample (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
48 See AncestryDNA Research Project, ANCESTRYDNA, https://support.ancestry.com/s/article/AncestryDNA-Research-Project (last visited Jan. 30, 2021).
49 See GEDMatch, supra note 14.
50 See id.
51 See id.
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since they are comprised of DNA results from a multitude of directto-consumer databases—making them almost more valuable than
the original databases that actually analyze the results.52
Generally, governmental and commercial databases serve
largely different purposes and are filled with different populations
of people. As a result, the traditional method of searching these
databases is different, because the searcher of one database is
looking for different information than the searcher of another.
For instance, governmental databases are usually searched by
submitting a certain profile to the database and conducting a
search to find out if any DNA samples already in the database
match that sample exactly—a method hereafter referred to as an
“exact suspect search.”53 The purpose of this is to find out if the
unknown owner of the submitted sample is already identified
somewhere in the system because of a previous crime.54
Contrarily, commercial DNA databases are generally used for
genealogical searches—hereafter referred to as a “familial search.”
Instead of looking for an exact match in the database when submitting a sample, the searcher is looking for samples from people
who are part of the same family as the submitted sample.55 Thus,
instead of identification purposes, commercial databases are
largely used for genealogical services, familial searching, and finding out more about the ancestry of the submitted sample.56
However, in recent years, law enforcement has tried incorporating familial searching into searches of the governmental databases.57 Instead of just looking for an exact suspect match in a
state’s governmental database in order to identify the owner of a
given DNA sample, a search would also be done to determine if
any of the owner’s family members could also be identified in the

52 See Bloomberg, supra note 28 (“In the case of DNA sites, no extraordinary measures
may be necessary, as such services as GEDmatch, MyHeritage, and Family Tree DNA allow
investigators to view voluntarily posted data, including files from services like 23andMe
and Ancestry that don’t permit users to upload material from other sources.”). See also Levenson, supra note 8. AncestryDNA and 23andMe—two direct-to-consumer databases—
consist of over 15 million DNA profiles for comparison alone. See id.
53 See NDIS Fact Sheet, supra note 37.
54 See id.
55 See AncestryDNA FAQ, supra note 44.
56 See id.; see also 23andMe Law Enforcement Guide, supra note 27.
57 See Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching, 23
HARV. J. LAW & TEC 309, 310-11 (2010).
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database.58 Even though conducting a familial search would not
provide law enforcement with the identity of the owner of the sample they submitted, it would give them a much narrower pool of
possible owners.59 A seminal case involving this technique took
place in California in 2010, where police conducted a familial
search in the national database with a sample found at the scene
of a murder.60 The perpetrator was not in the system, but his son
was.61 This result led the police to the perpetrator, a serial killer
named Lonnie Franklin, Jr.62
This method of familial searching in the national database has
been criticized by privacy rights advocates because it opens the
door to a person being identified through a relative’s DNA due to
that relative committing a crime and thus having his DNA collected by the government.63 As of April 2018, only twelve states,
including California, had used any form of familial searching to
solve cold cases.64 Maryland and the District of Columbia banned
the practice of conducting familial searches in their state databases altogether.65
Since then, law enforcement in California has taken this method
even one step further. In April 2018, law enforcement used a commercial DNA database to identify family members of the DNA
sample they recovered from the scene of a murder committed in
the late 1970s.66 The “East Area Rapist,” later known as the
“Golden State Killer,”67 was an unidentified criminal who was
58 See id. at 311.
59 See id. at 318.
60 See Seth Augenstein, Familial Searching, Used in 10 States and Counting, Solves

the Unsolvable, FORENSIC MAG (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://www.forensicmag.com/news/2016/12/familial-searching-used-10-states-and-counting-solves-unsolvable.
61 See id.
62 See id.
63 See Suter, supra note 57, at 311-312.
64 See Rainey, supra note 23. Only Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota,
New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming had used any form of
familial searching within their criminal DNA databases to solve crimes. See id.
65 See id. Since the DNA profiles obtained by law enforcement are usually not obtained
from the person voluntarily (or by his own accord), the constitutionality of conducting a
familial search of DNA profiles in the national database would undergo a separate Fourth
Amendment analysis. See Suter, supra note 57, at 329. This separate analysis is outside
the scope of this note.
66 See Selk, supra note 13.
67 See Laura Wamsley, After Arrest of Suspected Golden State Killer, Details of His Life
Emerge, NPR (Apr. 26, 2018, 3:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/04/26/606060349/after-arrest-of-suspected-golden-state-killer-details-of-his-life-
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believed to have killed twelve people, raped at least fifty-one people, and burglarized countless California homes from 1974
through May 1986.68 However, even though DNA evidence had
been left at multiple scenes, law enforcement was never able to
apprehend the killer because his DNA was not an exact match to
any samples already in the FBI’s national database.69 That is until
April 2018, over forty years later, when law enforcement used
GEDMatch, a commercial DNA profile database, to identify family
members of the forensic profile left at the scene.70 In other words,
instead of using law enforcement’s own database, police searched
a commercial database for genetic links to the forty-year-old unidentified forensic profile—and it worked. Law enforcement began
searching “online family trees that appeared to match DNA samples from the East Area Rapist’s crimes,” and focused on those who
lived in the area at the time of the crimes in order to determine a
much more limited pool of possible suspects.71
Law enforcement was then able to narrow down suspects to Joseph DeAngelo, a person who was in the area during the commission of the crimes and was genetically linked to the forensic profile’s family members.72 Officers managed to collect a surreptitious
DNA sample from him.73 Then, when law enforcement ran DeAngelo’s DNA sample against the forensic samples from the crime
scenes, his sample was an exact match.74 DeAngelo was then arrested for the various rapes and murders committed throughout
the 1970s and 1980s.75 Facing the death penalty, DeAngelo pled
guilty to crimes he committed against eighty-seven victims spanning from 1975 to 1986 and was sentenced to eleven consecutive
life terms without the possibility of parole.76
emerge. Joseph DeAngelo began his criminal career as a home-invasion rapist, but as time
went on, he began killing his victims as well. Since his identity remained a mystery, his
aliases changed to reflect the types of crimes he was committing. See id.
68 See Sam Stanton & Ryan Lillis, Relative’s DNA From Genealogy Websites Cracked
East Area Rapist Case, DA’s Office Says, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 26, 2018, 2:01 PM),
https://www.sacbee.com/latest-news/article209913514.html.
69 See Selk, supra note 13.
70 See id.
71 Stanton & Lillis, supra note 68.
72 See Stanton & Smith, supra note 11.
73 See id.
74 See Stanton & Lillis, supra note 68.
75 See Stanton & Smith, supra note 11.
76 Michael Levenson, Golden State Killer Sentenced to Life in Prison Without Parole,
NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/21/us/golden-state-
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After this breakthrough, California and other states began looking into using commercial DNA databases. In June 2018, Washington police were able to arrest the person they believed to have
murdered twelve-year-old Michella Welch in 1986 using a genealogy service’s commercial DNA database.77 That same month,
Pennsylvania law enforcement accessed a commercial DNA database to solve the murder of Christy Mirack, a school teacher, which
happened in 1992.78 In May, police in Indiana, using the same
method, were able to locate a suspect for the 1988 rape and murder
of April Tinsley, an eight-year-old girl.79
Most recently, evidence obtained through an investigation using
a commercial DNA database was even presented in a trial for the
first time.80 On July 1, 2019, William Talbott II was convicted for
a double homicide he committed in 1987.81 Over thirty years after
he murdered a couple in Washington, Talbott was arrested and
tried in Snohomish County, where a jury found him guilty of two
counts of aggravated first-degree murder.82 That jury was the first
ever to hear evidence that was collected using commercial DNA
databases.83
Even still, questions are arising as to whether or not the use of
commercial databases is a constitutional way to find suspects.84
While supporters of law enforcement advocate for access to search
tools, privacy rights enthusiasts criticize the intrusion.85

killer-sentenced.html.
77 See Levenson, supra note 8.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See Heather Murphy, Genealogy Sites Have Helped Identify Suspects. Now They’ve
Helped Convict One, NEW YORK TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/us/dna-genetic-genealogy-trial.html.
81 See id.; see also Seattle Times Staff, SeaTac Man Convicted of 1987 Murders of Canadian
Couple after DNA Evidence Linked Him to Case, THE SEATTLE TIMES (June 28, 2019, 3:58
PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seatac-man-convicted-of-1987-murders-of-canadian-couple-after-dna-evidence-linked-him-to-case/.
82 See Caleb Hutton, Talbott trial testimony retraces a 30-year murder mystery,
HERALDNET (June 25, 2019, 12:24 PM), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/talbott-trial-testimony-retraces-a-30-year-murder-mystery; see also Seattle Times Staff, supra note 81.
83 See Murphy, supra note 80.
84 See Ford, supra note 25.
85 See id. “Handling such sensitive information creates additional challenges when it
comes to balancing the individual right to privacy with the state’s interest in combating
crime.” Id.
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B. Privacy Concerns
Right around the time of the “Golden State Killer” case, privacy
advocates began arguing that law enforcement’s use of commercial
DNA databases is essentially a “slippery slope” that implicates
major privacy concerns.86 Developments in science and technology
have always been a challenge for courts and legislative bodies, as
access to greater investigative power inevitably comes with it more
risks implicating privacy rights.87 In a recent study, privacy advocate Yaniv Erlich tested just how effective familial searches in
commercial databases could be by submitting samples to get an
idea of how many would lead to a familial match.88 Erlich found
that out of the samples he sent in, more than half had distant relatives who could be found in the commercial databases.89 In fact,
according to his research, “it will take only about two percent of an
adult population having their DNA profiled in a database before it
becomes theoretically possible to trace any person’s distant relatives from a sample of unknown DNA—and therefore, to uncover
their identity.”90 While some hail these results as promising for
law enforcement, Erlich worried that with this amount of information came the risk of illegitimate uses, such as exploitation or
use in medical studies without permission.91 To combat this, some
privacy advocates demand that law enforcement should only be
able to access information from commercial databases by obtaining a warrant. But the warrant process as applied here, as discussed in later sections of this note, does not make sense.92
86 Ed Cara, Ancestry Sites Could Soon Expose Nearly Anyone’s Identity, Researchers
Say, GIZMODO (Oct 11, 2018, 2:37 PM), https://gizmodo.com/ancestry-sites-could-soon-expose-nearly-anyones-identit-1829685818 “. . .[D]own the road, as things continue to evolve,
there could be people who use this for illegitimate reasons.” Id.
87 See e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); see also Riley v. California, 573
U.S. 373 (2014).
88 See Erlich et al., supra note 22.
89 See id.
90 Cara, supra note 86. As of February 2019, more than 26 million people have taken
an at-home ancestry test. This constitutes only about 0.35% of the world’s population. See
Antonio Regalado, More than 26 million people have taken an at-home ancestry test, MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612880/morethan-26-million-people-have-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test.
91 See id.
92 See id. (“In an ideal world, law enforcement agencies could also still access these
services, but only obtaining after explicit permission, such as through a warrant.”); see also
infra, note 190 and accompanying text.
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Some call for new laws to prohibit law enforcement’s use altogether.93 Jennifer Lynch, a senior attorney at the Electric Frontier
Foundation, noted that since genetic information has not been expressly protected under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]here are no
meaningful protections. And we need them.”94 In addition, the
American Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) Vera Eidelman has
made claims that law enforcement’s use of the databases implicates illegality.95 Eidelman remarked that because companies like
23andMe lack legally reliable evidence that a certain DNA sample
or account is connected to a certain person, it should not be considered “proof in a legal context.”96
Significantly, a Maryland legislator has even proposed a law97
that would “prohibit use of a familial DNA database for the purposes of crime-solving.”98 The bill, sponsored by Delegate Charles
Sydnor, seeks to ban law enforcement from accessing “popular consumer genetic databases” because the people submitting their
DNA samples to the companies are doing so without the
knowledge that law enforcement could access the information.99
Sydnor claims that these types of searches are violations of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.100 A journalist reported
on the Talbott case stated: “The defense could have challenged the
use of genetic genealogy on privacy grounds, or as a violation of
people’s right to control their personal data.”101
Most recently, lawyers defending thirty-seven-year-old Jesse
Bjerke in a Virginia rape case moved to suppress the DNA evidence inculpating the defendant that was first discovered using a
commercial DNA database, arguing that “assembling and testing
93 See Bloomberg, supra note 28.
94 Bloomberg, supra note 28.
95 See Vera Eidelman, Why the Golden State Killer Investigation is Cause for Concern,

ACLU (May 11, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/medical-and-geneticprivacy/why-golden-state-killer-investigation-cause.
96 See id.
97 See Public Safety – DNA Analysis – Search of Data Base, Md H.B. 30, Reg. Sess.
(2019).
98 Natalie Jones, Bill Seeks to Prohibit Using DNA Databases to Solve Crime, AP NEWS
(Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/ddfa055f09e842bdbbbd38c2fba74a1a. This proposition comes after a history of Maryland’s distaste for familial DNA searching: Maryland
is one of only two jurisdictions in the country that bans familial searching in government
databases, and the only state to ban searches for blood relatives. See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See Murphy, supra note 80.
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a genetic profile without a warrant violates the Constitution.”102
In that case, which is unique in that the crime had only been committed three years prior to the use of the commercial DNA database in the defendant’s arrest and prosecution, the defendant argued that he did not knowingly expose his DNA profile to the
public by submitting it to a commercial DNA database.103 Because
the government did not obtain a warrant, he argued, this was an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment—comparable
to searching the contents of a cellphone, which the Supreme Court
has ruled is an unreasonable search that requires a warrant.104
However, the judge denied this motion, and the defendant pled
guilty in October of 2019.105
The Supreme Court most recently addressed Fourth Amendment rights in Carpenter v. United States, in which the Court held
that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in data
recovered from cellphone towers that shows their movements.106
Carpenter was the latest in a long line of Supreme Court decisions
struggling with technology and its implications for constitutional
rights.107 The Court’s consideration of Carpenter sparked speculation as to whether it might soon take a case regarding law enforcement access to commercial DNA databases.108 However, with the
narrow ruling in Carpenter, it is unclear what the Court might decide.
The question here is whether genealogy companies are constitutionally permitted to share this information with law enforcement
102 Rachel Weiner, Alexandria Rape Suspect Challenging DNA search Used to
Crack Case, WASHINGTON POST (June 10), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/alexandria-rape-suspect-challenging-dna-search-used-to-crackcase/2019/06/10/24bd0e34-87a5-11e9-a870b9c411dc4312_story.html?utm_term=.a80ac9b4d330.
103 See id.
104 See id.
105 Bjerke Convicted of Rape and Firearms Offenses, City of Alexandria (Oct.
18,
2019), https://www.alexandriava.gov/commattorney/info/default.aspx?id=111830.
106 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
107 See e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that when the Government uses a device that is not in public use to explore the details of the home that would
have been unobservable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and presumptively unreasonable without a warrant); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014)
(holding that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search of data
on cell phones); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor
the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a “search”).
108 See Ford, supra note 25.
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without running afoul of the customer’s Fourth Amendment
rights. The answer to that question lies in the “third-party doctrine” of the Fourth Amendment.109
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”110 This protection has been scrutinized and
clarified ever since its inclusion in the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has provided guidance on what constitutes a search
or seizure in the first place under the Fourth Amendment.
One of the most important clarifications was provided by the
Court in Katz v. United States.111 In Katz, the Court first articulated what it means to have a “reasonable expectation of privacy,”
and how that expectation dictates what constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.112 Over time, the Court
has confirmed that a reasonable expectation of privacy is both subjective and objective, meaning that the person seeking privacy
must actually expect privacy and that expectation must be reasonable to society.113 Thus, if a warrantless government search
109
110
111
112

See infra Analysis Section 1.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
See id. at 351-52. In this case, the Court abandoned the old understanding of what
the Fourth Amendment protected (the trespass doctrine, which only protects tangible
items) and restructured its understanding to include intangible privacy interests. The
Court essentially moved the focus of the protections from a person’s things to people themselves. However, in doing so, the Court simultaneously narrowed the protection of anything
that wasn’t within the privacy expectations of the person, i.e. anything that the person
knowingly exposes to the public or another person. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 6 (2014).
113 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Of course, whether an expectation is
reasonable according to society is subject to a number of factors, including the importance
of the needs of law enforcement in conducting the search. The Supreme Court balances an
individual’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures against the needs of
law enforcement—the more important those needs, the more reasonable the search. See e.g.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (holding that a warrant is not required to perform a protective sweep of rooms adjoining the place of arrest in a home where there are
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contravenes a person’s actual expectation of privacy, and that expectation is reasonable according to society, that warrantless
search would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.114
Because of the Fourth Amendment’s “fruit of the poisonous tree”
concept, if evidence is obtained through an unconstitutional search
it is excluded altogether at trial.115
However, this protection against warrantless, unreasonable
searches has been subject to many exceptions and conditions over
time. One of these exceptions is the “third-party doctrine.”116 The
third-party doctrine declares that a person who voluntarily gives
information to a third party has no reasonable expectation of privacy in that information because he assumes the risk of disclosure
to other parties.117 Thus, if a person shares information with a
company or third party, that person should no longer reasonably
expect that the information is private, and the police no longer
need a warrant to obtain it.118 The Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches—a warrantless search of property
that someone has given away is not unreasonable.119
Further, the third-party doctrine exception extends even to information that is “revealed on the assumption that it will be used
only for a limited purpose.”120 This extension was justified by the
Court because it is the original who takes a risk in revealing his
information to a third party and thus he cannot expect the information will not be given to the government, or any other party, for
additional purposes.121
“articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would
warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”).
114 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that the use of letters
obtained by an unconstitutional search at trial was a “prejudicial error”); see also Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures
in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in a state court).
116 See THOMPSON II, supra note 111.
117 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has
held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties.”).
118 See id.; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
119 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
120 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
121 See id. In Miller, law enforcement requested access to the defendant’s bank records
and other financial information without obtaining a warrant to gain evidence of his alleged
crime. The Court reasoned that because the defendant had voluntarily given his information to the bank, the bank was free to disseminate it to the government if it wished. Id.
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Recently, however, the Court has been narrowing the thirdparty exception as technology has become more prevalent in peoples’ lives and private information becomes more difficult to keep
to one’s self.122 For example, in Carpenter, the Court held that cellsite records,123 because of the “nature of the particular documents
sought,” were protected by Fourth Amendment rights and did not
fall within the third-party doctrine, even though they were technically given to the phone company, which was a third party.124 The
court dictated three main reasons for this decision. While the first
reason was more specifically related to location information, the
second two reasons analyzed the type of information sought and
whether the third-party doctrine applied.
First, the Court explained that it is already well-established
that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
physical movements, which applied to the information the cell-site
location provided.125 The Court explained that the amount of information a phone carries documenting the user’s presence at
every moment of every day is a new-age privacy concern that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment under clear precedent.126
Next, the Court considered the amount of “identifying information” in the property searched in order to determine whether
there is a legitimate expectation of privacy in the property.127 The
Court found that the vast amount of identifying information in
cell-site location tracking was too intrusive to be considered standard, business-related information—that is, the type of information
normally excepted by the third-party doctrine.128 The Court explained that if information as detailed as one’s location at every
second of every day was included within the scope of the third-

122 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (“As technology has
enhanced the government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to ‘assure[ ] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.’” (Quoting Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001))).
123 Cell-site records are the records a phone company keeps about a person’s location
according to his cell phone. See id. at 2225.
124 Id. at 2219.
125 Id. at 2217.
126 Id. (“As with GPS information, the timestamped data provides an intimate window
into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”).
127 Id. at 2219 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2493).
128 See id.; see also Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
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party doctrine, the doctrine would lose its original justification.129
After all, the doctrine was meant to be an exception for the government to gain access to documents that record a singular act or
set of acts conducted with or through the third party—not an unlimited backdoor into the most intimate parts of one’s day-to-day
activities and everyday actions.130
Finally, the Court considered the voluntariness of the exposure
to the third party by the owner.131 The Court, in the past, has explained that it would be unreasonable to freely give one’s information away to third parties but still expect that information to
remain private and within the scope of the owner’s intended audience.132 But in Carpenter, the Court recognized that “[c]ell phone
location information is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term” for the purposes of the third-party doctrine, and
thus does not fall neatly into the original justification for the exception.133 Here, the Court drew an important distinction between
information affirmatively disseminated to the third party and information that is taken from the person by the third party, albeit
consensually, but only collaterally with the original purpose of the
contract.134 In other words, the Court differentiated between information actively given and information passively given without
any specific action from the person. The root of the “voluntariness
of exposure” justification hinges on the fact that the owner assumed the risk of disseminating his information to the third
party.135
A cellphone automatically logs the location of the user without
any affirmative action by him, seriously diminishing his part in
sharing the information and, therefore, making it less likely that
he assumed any risk.136 The Court ruled that because cell phone
companies collect location information collaterally and are not affirmatively given that information, “in no meaningful sense does
the user voluntarily ‘assume the risk’ of turning over a
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2221-22.
See id. at 2219, 2223.
See id. at 2220.
See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
See id.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the
network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”).
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comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”137 Further, the
Court explained that having a phone in this day in age is integral
in a person’s life.138 Thus, it would be unfair and unreasonable to
expect a person to forego having a cell phone just to opt-out of sharing his location with the government at all times.
Notwithstanding its decision in Carpenter, the Supreme Court
has consistently and historically held that the third-party doctrine
exception applies to information that the person assumes or is told
will not be given to the government or another third party.139 The
assumption of risk is still present when someone gives his information away, no matter how comfortable he is in the third party’s
trustworthiness.140 The Court has explained that the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution “does not prohibit
the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information
is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.”141
Lastly, the Supreme Court noted that its decision in Carpenter
is a narrow one and does not disturb the decisions in Smith v. Maryland142 or United States v. Miller,143 the Court’s two most important decisions regarding the third-party doctrine; the Carpenter decision solely applies to real-time cell-site location
information.144 Thus, the third-party doctrine precedent before
this case remains theoretically untouched. Regardless, some constitutional law commentators believe the Court is hinting at narrowing the third-party doctrine as technology continues to advance.145
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 745).
See id.
See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
See id.
Id.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
Id.
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). Instead of altering the
third-party doctrine analysis laid out by the Supreme Court through precedent, the Court
explained that this type of information (cell-site location information) simply falls outside
the exception. However, because it is the first of its kind in terms of new technology, it is
unclear what other types of new technology would fall outside the exception and what types
would still fall within. See id.
145 See Ford, supra note 25; Jake Laperruque, The Carpenter Decision: A Step Forward
for Privacy Rights but Major Problems Remain, POGO (June 28, 2018),

MCLOUGHLIN MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

DNA DATABASES AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT

7/28/21 5:09 PM

337

III. LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF COMMERCIAL DATABASES IS
CONSTITUTIONAL
Law enforcement access to commercial DNA databases, albeit
limited to investigations of violent or sexual assault crimes, should
be held constitutional under the third-party doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment because the small expectation of privacy left in information derived from samples of DNA voluntarily given to a third
party is outweighed by law enforcement’s great need to effect investigations into these types of crimes. In the balance between
privacy rights and public safety, the expectation of privacy in information disseminated to a third party is too low, if it exists at
all, in comparison to the government’s interest in solving the
alarming number of unsolved violent crimes.
A. Expectations of Privacy of Both the Customer and the Target are Low or Nonexistent.
In general, there are two parties who may be affected by law
enforcement’s use of commercial DNA databases: the eventual target of the search—the suspect—and the person who submitted the
DNA to the database—the genealogy customer. As explained
above, in familial searches, those parties are not always the same
person. Of course, there are times when the suspect in a case will
have submitted his own DNA to a commercial DNA database, and
a search of the database reveals that his DNA matches the law
enforcement-submitted sample, producing an exact suspect
match. This scenario makes the target of the DNA search and the
genealogy customer, or the owner of the sample, the same person—thus the target and genealogy customer necessarily possess
the same rights. However, when the target and the genealogy
https://www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/06/carpenter-decision-huge-step-forward-for-privacyrights-but-major-problems-remain. (“This will have major ramifications not just for other
Fourth Amendment cases involving smartphones, but also involving a host of other technologies. From now on, the standard of “voluntarily” giving up data is not whether it was
technically possible to instead live in a hut off the grid, but rather whether such data stems
from a necessary action to participate in modern society.”). See Michael Bahar, et. al., Third
Party-Crashing? The Fate of the Third-Party Doctrine, LAWFARE (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/third-party-party-crashing-fate-third-party-doctrine.
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customer are separate people, they possess separate rights. Part
III(A)(i) will address the genealogy customer’s Fourth Amendment
rights—whether or not he is also the target. Part III(A)(ii) will
address the target’s Fourth Amendment rights when he is not also
the customer.
i.

Expectation of the Genealogy Customer

There is very little (if any) expectation of privacy in property
disseminated to a third party.146 In the context of governmental
searches of commercial DNA databases, the government would not
violate the customer’s Fourth Amendment rights by using this
method of searching because it falls within the third-party doctrine exception. Before Carpenter, there was no question as to
whether the law would allow for a commercial DNA database to
disseminate volunteered information about its customers because
the customers had given such information to the third-party commercial database company.147 But even though Carpenter narrows
that exception, information derived from DNA samples given to
third party companies still falls well within the third-party doctrine exception because this type of evidence is distinguishable
from the evidence in Carpenter.
As discussed in the previous section, Carpenter created a more
updated analysis that incorporated technology into a historically
non-technological exception to the warrant requirement. One of
the points of analysis—sharing of location information—is irrelevant to this discussion.148 Thus, the analysis here is focused on the
146 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44; Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2216.
147 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Smith 442 U.S. at 742-43.
148 The first prong of the analysis in Carpenter—the fact that the information involved

the subject’s location—is irrelevant to this analysis because here, DNA information does
not necessarily involve an individual’s location. While a DNA sample in a specific place may
provide circumstantial evidence that a person was present there at some point, DNA does
not provide information as to a person’s whereabouts at a specific time. Location information privacy has been thoroughly litigated and has clear precedent, which is why the
Court ruled partially on those grounds—separate from its third-party doctrine analysis.
The Court has already held that an individual’s GPS location is private and that a warrant
is needed for the government to obtain a digitally-created map of a person’s whereabouts.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). Thus, because DNA information does
not give the government access to a person’s continual whereabouts, that part of the analysis does not apply here.
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remaining two points: the pervasiveness of the identifying information involved in the search and the voluntariness of the exposure of the subject of the search.
First, while one’s DNA can certainly be used to identify a person
through investigatory means, DNA is not considered “identifying
information” under United States law because it does not actually
identify someone without additional samples, as opposed to evidence such as medical records.149 Thus, it is a different type of
identifying information than the location information in Carpenter, which fell outside the third-party doctrine exception. The information at issue in Carpenter, if given to the government, would
alone have provided law enforcement with an unlimited amount of
information that revealed where the defendant had been at any
point of any day.150 Without needing any additional information,
law enforcement would acquire an unreasonable amount of intrusive information in their investigation of the defendant.
Contrarily, access to information derived from DNA samples is
much more similar to the snapshot-like information151 obtained in
Smith v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court decided the thirdparty doctrine applied: a piece of data about a single point in time
instead of a live stream of continuous identifying information.152
In fact, a DNA sample can be more adequately compared to a fingerprint than to a live stream of someone’s location.153 Instead of
gaining access to real-time surveillance of the target of the search,
law enforcement is accessing a “fingerprint” of sorts, identifying a
certain person that can be linked to another “fingerprint” of the
149 Chelsea Whyte, Family-Tree Forensics, NEW SCIENTIST (August 11, 2018),
https://web-a-ebscohost-com.jerome.stjohns.edu/ehost/delivery?…2540sdc-v-sessmgr01%26bdata%3dJnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%253d%253d (“Despite uniquely identifying you, DNA records are considered in US law to be de-identified information that can
be given to police without a court order.”).
150 See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2220 (“[T]his case is not about ‘using a phone’ or a person’s movement at a particular time. It is about a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical
presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years.”).
151 In Smith, law enforcement gained warrantless access to the list of phone numbers
dialed by the defendant. The Court argued that because this information was not as intrusive as listening in on a conversation or recording what was being said and was instead
simply a record of who he had called, the third-party doctrine applied. Smith, 442 U.S. at
743-44.
152 See id. at 743 (“Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to keep the
contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated
to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.”).
153 See National Institute of Justice, Using DNA to Solve Cold Cases, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE (Jul. 2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/194197.pdf.
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same person if another were to be acquired. These “fingerprints”
are not as intrusive as cell-site location information because they
do not give law enforcement access to one’s whereabouts at all
times; they merely tell law enforcement that the owner of the “fingerprint” may have been present at a particular crime scene at
some point. Of course, DNA profiles are unique to each individual,
but they are not maps of a person’s life; they are simply coded
name tags that do not contain any identifying information on their
own.
Next, the DNA samples in commercial DNA databases were unquestionably given affirmatively and voluntarily. Not only do people send in their DNA samples to the companies, but they pay the
company to specifically analyze their DNA samples to report back
identifying information about the customers.154 In Carpenter, the
Court ruled that it would be unreasonable to include location information in the third-party doctrine because people are not affirmatively sending in their location when they buy a cell phone;
it is just something that is recorded when one owns a phone.155
This is completely distinguishable from the act of sending a company one’s DNA sample. The affirmative action—in fact, the only
action—one takes in contracting with commercial DNA databases
is the voluntary dissemination of one’s DNA and the information
attached to it. Instead of being a collateral part of the transaction,
giving the company one’s DNA is the entirety of the transaction.
Further, sending DNA to a company for genealogical purposes
is certainly not a “pervasive and insistent”156 part of daily life as
the Court meant it in Carpenter. Taking this action is nowhere
near as integral in someone’s life as owning a cell phone. It would
be much more reasonable to simply forego paying for a genealogy
service if one did not want a third party to have information derived from his DNA than it would be to expect someone to forego
owning a cell phone for the same reason. Therefore, DNA samples
in commercial databases are voluntarily and affirmatively shared
for the purposes of the third-party doctrine.
154 See 23andMe supra note 44; AncestryDNA FAQ supra note 44.
155 See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2220 (“[A] cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its

operation, without any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up. . . . Apart
from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid leaving behind a
trail of location data.”).
156 Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
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Finally, the fact that the information is given to these companies
for the limited purpose of analyzing the DNA and conducting a
familial search does not preclude the information from falling
within the third-party doctrine.157 As the Court in Miller explained, someone’s belief and trust that the information he gave
away will only be used for the purpose for which he gave it away
is a risk he takes to his own detriment.158 This, it follows, would
still be the case even if companies claimed to prohibit law enforcement from submitting the DNA sample of a suspected criminal
from a crime scene.159 Once a company decides to disseminate the
information it was given, it would be theoretically free to do so.160
Thus, the fact that customers did not give samples of their DNA
with the expectation that they would be searched by law enforcement is not a reason to preclude law enforcement from gaining access.

157 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
158 See id.
159 Some companies include in their policies a promise to not disseminate information

to law enforcement, or a concession that in certain circumstances, they will. See, e.g.,
23andMe, Privacy Highlights, https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last updated Oct.
30, 2020) (“We will not provide information to law enforcement or regulatory authorities
unless required by law to comply with a valid court order, subpoena, or search warrant . . .
.”). While this theoretically does not alter whether or not they may “change their minds”
and do so within the scope of the Fourth Amendment third-party doctrine, it may affect the
Court’s decision as to whether or not someone’s expectation of privacy in the information
was legitimate and reasonable. For example, a person who only submitted his DNA sample
to a company that promised not to cooperate with law enforcement may have a better argument as to his legitimate expectation of privacy than someone who disseminated his information to a company that did not specify whether it would or a company that specified
that it would.
160 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. It is worth noting that for those commercial DNA databases that promise not to comply with law enforcement in their policy statements, other
laws outside the scope of this note may determine whether or not that company is free to
refuse compliance. The third-party doctrine of the Fourth Amendment is only applicable
when determining whether or not a company may cooperate with law enforcement to begin
with. Procedures that involve non-cooperation of the companies are outside the scope of this
note.
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ii. Expectation of the Target
There is no expectation of privacy in someone else’s property.161
Thus, when the target of a familial search is identified using someone else’s DNA profile—namely, a relative’s—the target cannot assert that he had an expectation of privacy in that relative’s DNA.
According to the Supreme Court, “Fourth Amendment rights are
personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may
not be vicariously asserted.”162 The Court made clear in Alderman
v. United States that one’s rights must have been personally violated in order to claim a Fourth Amendment violation and assert
the exclusion of evidence; it is not enough for the person to have
simply been negatively affected by the introduction of damaging
evidence.163 The Court has also stated that “[i]n order to qualify
as a ‘person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure,’ one
must have been a victim of a search . . . as distinguished from one
who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as
a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.”164
For example, if someone’s house is unconstitutionally searched
by the government, that person can claim a violation of his constitutional rights.165 However, if evidence is found during that unconstitutional search that incriminates someone else—like if
someone who does not live in the house hides drugs in the homeowner’s drawer—the incriminated person cannot claim that his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated.166 The government did
not search his property and therefore his rights were not threatened.167
When law enforcement uses familial searching to find family
161 See Rakas v. Illinios, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978).
162 Id. (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
163 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171 (holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the

petitioner in the case of an illegal wiretapping because he was not the subject of the search).
164 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
165 See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 173.
166 See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85.
167 See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174. Further, the homeowner could not suppress the evidence being used against the incriminated person; even though the homeowner’s rights
were violated, the only person who can suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence is
the person being criminally charged using evidence that was unconstitutionally obtained
against him. See id. Thus, the suppression of this kind of evidence has to be entirely through
the violation of the suppressor’s rights.
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members of a forensic profile left at the scene of a crime, they are
conducting a search of the genealogy customers’ DNA, not the suspect himself. Therefore, if familial searching is used to target a
suspect and a match in the DNA of the suspect’s family is obtained
through that search, the target cannot assert a violation of his
rights—that right is reserved for the genealogy customer who was
searched.168 Thus, in the “Golden State Killer” case,169 the defendant would not be able to assert that his rights were violated by the
search that resulted in a familial match to his relative’s DNA.
Moreover, even if the court found that the search of his relative’s
DNA was unconstitutional as to the relative, that conclusion
would be irrelevant to the prosecution of Joseph DeAngelo.170
However, as discussed, that search would be constitutional regardless.
B. Public Safety Needs are High
Even if the Court did find that there is a small but legitimate
expectation of privacy in the DNA samples customers give to commercial DNA databases, that expectation would be outweighed by
the public safety needs that could be solved through law enforcement’s access to these databases. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the legitimate needs of public safety are consistently
weighed as a factor against the privacy rights in search issues
when determining whether a search was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.171 The more important the governmental interest, the more likely the Court is to find that the search was reasonable under the circumstances.172 In fact, the Court has stated

168
169
170
171

See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85.
Ford, supra note 25.
See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85.
See e.g. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (holding
that regulations on toxicology testing of railroad employees covered by the Hours of Service
Act did not violate the Fourth Amendment because government interests outweighed the
employee’s diminished expectation of privacy).
172 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (citations omitted) (“It goes without
saying that the Fourth Amendment only bars unreasonable searches and seizures. Our
cases show that in determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”).
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that “the permissibility of a particular practice ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”173
The government’s interest in solving violent crimes using DNA
evidence from databases is legitimate, and the use of those databases would greatly promote the government’s interest in public
safety. First, DNA evidence is unquestionably helpful in investigations of violent crimes.174 In fact, a study researching the use of
forensic evidence in investigations found that when an investigation used scientific evidence, clearance rates175 were three times
greater than in cases where scientific evidence was not used.176 In
particular, the Supreme Court has articulated great deference to
law enforcement in cases specifically related to the collection of
DNA for crime-solving purposes.177 In fact, the Court has made it
clear that “[i]n some circumstances, such as ‘[w]hen faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy,
minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain
. . . circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.’”178
Law enforcement’s access to commercial DNA databases would
astronomically benefit law enforcement in solving crimes by giving
them access to millions of more profiles to which they could compare a forensic “John Doe” profile left at the scene of a crime. AncestryDNA and 23andMe alone could provide millions of more profiles for comparison.179 Access to this amount of profiles would be
an incalculable benefit to law enforcement’s ability to solve cold
173 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)).
174 See Using DNA to Solve Crimes, U.S. DEP’T JUST. ARCHIVES, https://www.jus-

tice.gov/archives/ag/advancing-justice-through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes
(last updated Mar. 7, 2017) (“When used to its full potential, DNA evidence will help solve
and may even prevent some of the Nation’s most serious violent crimes.”). See Morgan &
Kena, supra note 1 (explaining how violent crimes include sexual assault).
175 A crime is “cleared,” generally, when a suspect is arrested for or charged with a
reported crime. FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATIONS: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, supra note 6.
176 Joseph Peterson, et al., The Role and Impact of Forensic Evidence in the Criminal
Justice Process, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 2010), at 1,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf.
177 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461, 465–66 (2013) (holding that the collection
of DNA of arrestees charged with serious crimes for crime-solving purposes without a warrant was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment).
178 Id. at 447 (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001)).
179 Levenson, supra note 8.
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cases for which they have acquired a DNA sample but do not have
a match, just like the Golden State Killer case. In just the first
year after the detectives in the Golden State Killer case shared the
details of their breakthrough, there have been at least three breakthroughs in cold cases using the same familial searching method
via commercial DNA databases.180
Beyond solving crimes, law enforcement’s access to these profiles could actually help prevent violent crime. According to a 2012
study, “larger DNA databases reduce crime rates, especially in categories where forensic evidence is likely to be collected at the
scene—e.g., murder, rape, assault, and vehicle theft.”181 In the
study, the researchers measured the probability of conviction of
re-offenders whose DNA profiles had been collected and added to
the governmental DNA database and of those whose DNA had not
yet been collected.182 The study found that those offenders whose
DNA profiles were already in the database were significantly more
likely to be convicted of the crime—i.e., more likely to be caught,
which is shown to be a more effective deterrent than a longer sentence.183
The study further found that in areas where DNA was collected
by the government under additional circumstances—like if that
particular state collected DNA for more types of crimes—the crime
rates were significantly reduced when this change was implemented. The study estimated that if a database is expanded by
twelve percent, that expansion would result in a 3.2% decrease in
murders, a 6.6% decrease in rapes, and a 2.9% decrease in aggravated assaults.184 Most importantly, the study found that “in the
United States, DNA profiling makes violent offenders seventeen
percent less likely to re-offend.”185 This, in turn, would theoretically have had a deterrent effect on a criminal like the Golden
State Killer. The study suggested that increasing the likelihood of
180 Id.
181 Jennifer L. Doleac, The Effects of DNA Databases on Crime, at 1 (American Eco-

nomic Association Working Paper, 2012), https://siepr.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Doleac_DNADatabases_0_5.pdf.
182 Id. at 13.
183 Id. at 2, 16 (“The probability of reoffending and being convicted for any offense is
3.7 percentage points (23.4%) higher for those with a profile in the DNA database than
those without.”).
184 Id. at 22.
185 Doleac, supra note 24.
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getting caught significantly deters offenders from re-offending altogether.186
Law enforcement’s access to commercial DNA databases would
create the same deterrent effect as a larger database would for the
same reasons. The study makes clear that as long as offenders are
affected by the idea of going to prison, “increasing the probability
of conviction might be a more cost-effective crime prevention strategy than increasing sentences.”187 As shown in Erlich’s study, access to commercial DNA databases would give law enforcement a
substantially higher chance of finding a match for the crime scene
sample, since more than half of the people in the study were linked
in the commercial databases.188
It follows, of course, that identifying perpetrators more often
could not only create a deterrent effect among repeat offenders but
could incapacitate more would-be repeat offenders before they ever
had the chance to re-offend. If the Golden State Killer had been
caught and incapacitated sooner, he would not have had the
chance to commit as many horrible crimes as he did, deterred or
not. Thus, not only could law enforcement’s access to commercial
DNA databases help solve violent crimes—it could prevent the
crimes from happening altogether.
C. Privacy Advocates’ Arguments are Misguided
Of course, there are proponents of individuals’ privacy rights
who argue this method of searching is an invasion of privacy and
should be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, despite the high
benefit to law enforcement. These individuals argue that this exception to the warrant requirement is too broad, and police should
be required to obtain a warrant if they want to gain access to the
database in order to conduct a search for a match.189 However,
186
187
188
189

Doleac, supra note 181, at 25.
Id. at 7.
Erlich, supra note 88.
See Ronald Bailey, What the Golden State Killer Case’s Use of DNA Means for Your
Personal Privacy, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (May 24, 2018, 11:50 AM),
https://www.ocregister.com/2018/05/24/what-the-golden-state-killer-cases-use-of-dnameans-for-your-personal-privacy; see also Cara, supra note 86 (“In an ideal world, law enforcement agencies could also still access these services, but only obtaining after explicit
permission, such as through a warrant.”).
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their warrant proposal fails to account for the fact that it would be
impossible to obtain a warrant to search for a DNA sample from
“John Doe,” the suspected killer or rapist, or his relative for comparison because the police do not yet know the identity of the person for whom they are searching.190
When police use exact suspect or familial searches, they do so
precisely because they need to find a name attached to this particular DNA sample in order to obtain a warrant for that person’s
DNA. Obtaining a warrant is impossible before these searches are
conducted. Commercial DNA databases have solely been used by
law enforcement as an investigative tool in the process of finding
a perpetrator—not used for obtaining actual DNA from the company.191 Thus, to make an arrest, the police would still have to go
through regular police procedure in obtaining the actual suspect’s
DNA—all the commercial DNA database gives law enforcement is
a closer idea of where to look.
This reality about the investigative process is also the reason
why the argument is irrelevant that commercial DNA database
information is too unreliable to be legal proof. Law enforcement
does not use the information gained from the databases as legal
proof. Law enforcement uses these databases to point them in the
right direction in order to obtain legal proof—just like every other
investigative technique. Thus, it does not matter how “unreliable”
privacy advocates claim these services to be—if it points to a deadend, then law enforcement needn’t look any further. For example,
in the Golden State Killer case, after law enforcement narrowed
its pool of suspects down to relatives of the DNA match, they conducted their investigation just as they always would have—and
they still had to collect Joseph DeAngelo’s DNA sample through a
traditional method.192 The DNA match was simply used to narrow
down suspects during the investigation procedure.
Moreover, this argument suggests that if obtaining a warrant is
impossible, the next most reasonable requirement would be to
force every genealogy customer to obtain the consent of all of his
family members who his DNA sample could possibly negatively
190 U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” Id. (emphasis added).
191 See Cara, supra note 86.
192 Id.

MCLOUGHLIN MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

348

7/28/21 5:09 PM

JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

[Vol. 34:3

implicate if obtained by law enforcement.193 But this is nonsensical: people submit their DNA to these companies to find out the
identities of their relatives in the first place. Forcing people to
acquire consent from the very relatives they are seeking to find
demonstrates a failure to understand the DNA industry and the
third-party doctrine. The law does not require people to seek out
every person who could possibly be affected by every personal decision they make; in fact, this is the very reason the third-party
doctrine exception exists to begin with.194
CONCLUSION
Fifty-one rapes and twelve murders . . . . It is
time for all victims to grieve and take measure one last time. To bring closure to the anguish that we’ve all suffered for the last 40some-odd years. It is time for the victims to
begin to heal. So long overdue . . . . To the entire reservoir of victims out there: my sadness is with you. For the fifty-one ladies who
were brutally raped . . . sleep better tonight
. . . he’s in jail, and he’s history.195
These are the words of Bruce Harrington, the brother of one of
the people murdered by Joseph DeAngelo. Since his brother’s
death, Harrington has been an active voice in the push for legislation allowing law enforcement to use DNA evidence more efficiently and effectively to aid their investigations.196
193 Whyte, supra note 149 (“But genetic information is so widely spread that it would
be impossible to coordinate consent from everyone who shares your DNA.”).
194 See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 582
(2009). The third-party doctrine is meant to eliminate the never-ending chain of varying
expectations of privacy based on who has had ownership of a particular item over the course
of time. The doctrine is meant to simplify the process by which the expectation of privacy
as to a certain thing is evaluated—not make it more complicated.
195 Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office, East Area Rapist Press Conference
2018 04 25, YOUTUBE (April 25, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DmmK9LQNkoM.
196 Nicole Chavez, Arrest of alleged Golden State Killer brings ‘wave of relief’ to survivors and victims’ families, CNN (Feb. 13, 2019, 3:58 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/26/us/reaction-golden-state-killer-survivors-
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If the police have found a constitutional method that allows
them to serve justice to these victims, they should be able to use
it. If this technology existed in the 1970s and was used by law
enforcement, it is possible the Golden State Killer would not have
been able to effect the horrific acts he did. If this method were to
be used by law enforcement today, it is very likely that police could
stop a violent criminal in his tracks. In fact, the use of these databases could prevent that person from committing crimes in the
first place.
The fear of law enforcement gaining too much information is
valid—but misplaced here. Violent crime affects millions of people
over the course of their lifetime, and if law enforcement can investigate and prevent these crimes more effectively, it should.
Under the United States Constitution, law enforcement should
be able to access commercial DNA database information. The Supreme Court has confirmed, time and time again, that information
disseminated to a third party is not subject to an expectation of
privacy by the original owner. In addition, the benefit to the government’s interest in protecting the public is too high to be sacrificed for the small expectation of privacy left in information derived from a disseminated DNA sample.
Therefore, law
enforcement should continue to use this method of discovering suspects and continue finding justice for those who have been blocked
from ever getting it thus far. It is time for the United States justice
system to use this resource for the betterment of society and the
safety of its citizens—to solve and prevent the most violent of
crimes.

victims/index.html.

